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Introduction: Why Biopower? Why Now? 
V E R N O N  W .  C I S N E Y  A N D  N I C O L A E  M O R A R  
"Biopower," a phrase coined by Michel Foucault/ is timely in the sense 
that it characterizes what Foucault calls the "history of the present"^ (which 
is always, at the same time, a thought of the future). Biopower exposes 
the structures, relations, and practices by which political subjects are con­
stituted and deployed, along with the forces that have shaped and con­
tinue to shape modernity. But it is untimely in that its relevance is neces­
sarily dissimulated and masked—the mechanisms of power always have 
a way of covering their tracks. Before we can elaborate on this concept 
of biopower—the very etymology of which already points us toward the 
emergence of life into politics—it would behoove us to look at what power 
itself is, or what we typically think power itself is. For the traditional model 
of power is precisely what Foucault's concept of biopower assimilates and 
ultimately surpasses. 
An Analytics of Power 
What comes to mind when we think of powers Traditionally power was 
conceived as a commodity or a badge of honor supervening on life and the 
living, something one either has or lacks. Operating in a top-down man­
ner, the bearer of power dictates, on possible penalty of death, what those 
not in power may and may not do. In other words, power is strictly de­
limiting, the conceptual model being that of the sovereign who rules over 
his (or her) subjects with greater and lesser degrees of legitimacy and se­
verity. To guarantee its legitimacy, ^ower must produce its own bodies of 
knowledge, its truths. "Power," Foucault claims, "cannot be exercised unless 
a certain economy of discourses of truth functions in, on the basis of, and 
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thanks to, that power. During the mid- to late middle ages, as tensions 
between the limits of secular authority and those of religious authority be­
gan to escalate, the rediscovery of the Corpus lurus Civilis in about 1070 CE 
reanimated the Roman codes of juridicality and right, and served to adju­
dicate matters regarding the expanses and limitations of sovereign power. 
But whether the concepts of law and right were employed for the purposes 
of justifying the absolute power of the sovereign of drawing stria limits to 
it, and whether the sovereign is one, as in a monarchy, or many, as in a rep­
resentational government, what is never in question is the nature of power 
relations themselves as a form of delimitation or "deduction. 
On this model, the relation between the sovereign and the life of his 
subjects is a dissymmetrical one of permissiveness and seizure. The sov­
ereign is in a position to endanger the lives of his subjects—in cases when 
society is threatened, he may put them in harm's way to defend its (or his) 
security; and he is also in a position to terminate their lives-^in extreme 
cases when- they blatantly transgress the laws of the sovereign or direcdy 
(or indirectly) threaten his life andjhe lives of his subjects. The sovereign's 
power over life is thus the*power to let.live or to make die: "The right which 
was formulated as the 'power of life and death was in reality the right to 
take life or let live ['defaire mourir ou de /aisser vivre']. Its symbol, after all, 
was the sword/'" All of this operates under a perceived economy of sub­
traction, where the most visible manifestation of authority resides in the 
sovereign's power to take whatever possessions he wants or needs from his 
subjects, up to and including their very lives: "Power in this instance was 
essentially a right of seizure: of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life it­
self; it culminated in the privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress 
it."= The question of right, on this model, is thus always a question of how 
far this deductive power extends and what, if anything, constitute the rights 
of the subjects. However, it is always in relation to die delimiting sovereign 
that this question-is posed: "The system of right is completely centered on 
the king; it is; in other words, ultimately an elimination of domination 
and its consequences."® Thus the question of power is supplemental to or 
supervenient on, rather than constitutive of, the question of life: "For mil­
lennia, man remained what he was for Aristode: a living animal with the 
additional capacity for a political existence."^ 
The question of power, then, is triditionally one of domination, or the 
overexterision of power's i;each. However, as Foucault righdy notes, domi­
nation occurs in myriad ways, at all levels of society: not just between de 
facto political rulers and subjects, but between lovers, spouses, parents and 
children, teachers and students, ministers and congregations, managers 
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and employees, store clerks and customers—in short, in all relations of life. 
To truly get at the heart of power, therefore, requires not a general and to­
talizing interrogation of established systems of power, but rather close and 
particular'analyses of the fundamental, constitutive relations and mecha­
nisms at work in localized settings, which make the establishments of 
domination possible in the first place. Foucault writes, "As I see it, we have 
to. bypass or get around the problem of sovereignty . . . and the obedience 
of individuals who submit to it, and to reveal the problem of domination 
and subjugation insteadlof sovereignty and obedience."® 
•Against the traditional understanding of power, Foucault demonstrates 
that relations of power are not homogeneous commodities that one ei­
ther simply has or lacks; on the contrary, power pulses* and reverberates 
through all areas of life; he who is •dominant in one. situation (as perhaps 
a father over his children) is, in a different situation, subject (as employee 
and citizen). Thus, rather than power being'an external force that impinges 
on the lives of individuals (conceived as static and atomistic elements in 
the system), power flows through the lives of human beings, constituting 
the individuals themselves: "Power is exercised through-networks, and in­
dividuals do not simply circulate in those networks; they are in a position 
to both submit to and exercise this power. They are never the inert or con­
senting targets of power; they-are always its relays. In other words, power 
passes,through individuals. It is not applied to them."' In question, then, 
are the mechanisms through which domination and subjectivation, in all 
their various forms, take place. 
The Emergence of Biopower 
At this level of analysis emerges'a remarkable shift, according to Foucault. 
The sovereign, deductive model of power becomes "no longer the major 
form of power but merely one element among others."^" A more insidi­
ous and expansionary model appears (or is invented): "a new-mechanism 
of power which had very specific procedures, completely new instruments, 
and very different equipment. It was, I believe, absolutely incompatible 
with relations of sovereignty." This new mechanism of power applies 
directly to bodies and' what they do rather than -to the land and what it 
produces."'^ Power now appears not to limit but to provoke, purify, and 
disseminate'force for the purposes of management and control, ramified 
throughout all areas of life, the expansion of which is now its raison d'etre. 
This new form of power is "working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, 
optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating 
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forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated 
to impeding them, making them submit, opdestroying them. 
In this model of power, the expansion and efficiency of life, not its de­
duction,, becomes the primary function of power, and deductionis merely 
an instrument in the service of expansion. Deatii, in and of itself, is anath­
ema to a system of life: "death is power's limit, the moment that escapes 
it."'" Death therefore must become strictly instrumental, a sometime ne­
cessity ii>the service of life, a purgation of impurity or threat. "Foutauh calls 
this new form of power bio-power: "one would.have to speak of bio-power to 
designate what brought life and itsTnechanisms into the-realm of explicit 
calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of hu­
man life."'' And if, for Aristotle, human beings fundamentally are political 
animals, Foucault shows, us'that an important shift occurs with the emer­
gence «Df biopower; the modern man .becomes "an animal whose politics 
places his existence as a living being in question."'® 
Biopower operates around two poles, ".according to Foucault. The first, 
arising in the seventeenth century, functions at the micro level, what Fou-
cauk calls."an anatomo-politics of the human body."'^ It manifests in a host of 
disciplinary mechanisms and institutions: militarily, pedagogically, medi­
cally, and at the level of labor The human body comes to be seen as a 
machine, complete with functions and utilities, inputs and outputs, pre­
dictabilities and precisions. "Disciplinary power," as'Foucault already calls 
it in 1975 in Discipline and Punish,demands and guarantees of the body 
"its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its 
forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration 
into systems of efficient and economic control^."" No longer does power 
emphasize the law as the produrt of an arbitrary dictate of the sovereign. 
Rather it functions under a different type of rule, one located in the natural 
realm, a norm, legitimated by the sciences. ' 
The birth of this disciplinary form of power thus coincides historically 
with the multiplication-and expansion-of the.human sciences, which are 
made to serve as the legitimating, discourses jof this new form of power: 
"They are extraordinarily inventive when it comes to creating apparatuses 
to shape knowledge and expertise, and they <io support a discourse, but 
it is a discourse thctt cannot be the discourse of right or a. juridical dis­
course ... a discourse about a natural rule, or in other words, a norm. 
Disciplines will define not a code of law, but a code of normalization-, and 
they will necessarily refer to a theoretical horizon that is not the edifice 
of-law, but the field of the human sciences. "2° Beneath the banner of the 
anatomo-political, the concepts of law and right do not disappear or cease 
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to function; rather, the law itself increasingly serves the role of controlling, 
regulating, correcting, disciplining—in short, normalizing.^'^ 
The other pole around which biopower is organized arises later, "emerg­
ing in the second half of the eighteenth century: a new technology of 
power, but this time it is not disciplinary."^^ This second pole incorporates 
the elements of disciplinary power but uses them in a new way, and to a 
slightly different end, "not to the extent that they are nothing more than 
their individual bodies, but to the extent that they form, on the contrary, 
a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, 
death, production, illness, and so on."^' During this point in history, Fou­
cault claims, emerges a host of disciplines and bodies of knowledge whose 
task is to calculate, interpret, and predict the overall health of the society 
writ large. The regulation and tracking of birthrates, death rates, fertility 
rates, economic and poverty statistics, infant mortality, average longevity, 
and disease, as well as all of the various factors that influence these aspects, 
operate within a power centered not on the individual living body but on 
the species-body. This Foucault identifies as a "bio-politics of the population."^* 
These two aspects, according to Foucault, the disciplinary power mecha­
nisms of the body and the regulatory mechanisms of the population, con­
stitute the modem incamation of power relations, labeled as biopower. 
It is for this reason that sexuality, situated at the juncture of these two 
domains, becomes such a politicized issue in the eighteenth and nine­
teenth centuries (and, arguably, the twentieth and twenty-first centuries as 
well). It is something of a nexus in which these two, the health of the body 
and the health of society, discipline and regulation, fuse into one: "whence 
the four great lines of attack along which the politics of sex advanced for 
two centuries."^' The first two lines of attack are summed up with the dic­
tum in the name of regulation, discipline. The premature sexualization of chil­
dren is seen to cormpt their development and thus their ability to healthily 
integrate into the world; therefore, it harms the very health of society itself. 
Dr. John Harvey Kellogg was one of the more well-known and impassioned 
critics of childhood masturbation, famously recommending all manners 
of psychological manipulation and genital mutilation for both boys and 
girls as processes of normalization. Likewise, in the name of the overall 
health of the familial institution (as the cornerstone of a healthy society) 
came a massive increase in diagnoses- of female hysteria, a broad designa­
tion assigned to nearly any ailment that troubled a woman, especially one 
that was considered detrimental to the female reproductive capacities. This 
diagnosis brought with it an invasive medicalization of the womart's body 
and sexuality, including physician-prescribed "pelvic massage" as a regular 
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treatment and, in some cases, a forced hysterectomy if the woman failed 
to be "cured." The other two lines of attack accord with the inverse of the 
above declaration, in the name of discipline, regulation: "here the intervention 
was regulatory in nature, but it had to rely on the demand for individual 
disciplines and constraints."^® Birth colitrol became a highly controversial 
topic of public discourse in the late seventeenth century, continuing into 
the twentieth, as women more widely, and effectively began to use barrier 
methods of birth control. The dissemination of infoffflation about birth 
control as well-as the legality of its methods fluctuates in tandem with soci­
etal attitudes toward population as a whole. For the majority in this debate, 
a robust population (for reasons such as economic or moral) is seen as 
integral to the overall health of society; hence, numerous legal restrictions 
regulated birth control information or means during this period.^' Finally, 
the psychiatric "pathologization" of sexual perversions emerged as the 
study of sex in the form of a psychological phenomenon, but this brings 
the individual sexual praaices of human beings direcdy into the domain 
of abnormality and "corrective" intervention. 
These two poles of biopower (discipline and regulation), however, re­
main somewhat distinct throughout the eighteenth century, Foucault 
claims. When they finally unite, it is not in the form of a totalizing theory 
"but in the form of concrete arrangements that would go to make up the 
great technology of power in the nineteenth century."^® A new form of po­
litical and social organization emerges-in the nineteenth'century, one de­
pendent on the pushing to the limits of all human capacities. It demands 
social hierarchy, the machinization of bodies, and a vast'crop of willing 
subjects. Its ^ name—industrial capitalism: "the latter would "not have been 
possible withoufthe controlled insertion of bodies into.the machinery of 
production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to eco­
nomic processes. But this was not all it required; it also needed the growth 
of both of these factors, their reinforcement as well as their availability and 
docility; it had.to have methods-of power capable of optimizing forces, 
aptitudes, and lifein general without at the same time making them more 
difficult to govern."^' Biopower seeks the consistent and ongoing increase 
in the forces of life without thereby .suffering the loss of control over 
these forces—power in the service of vitality. All the societal institutions, 
therefore—the'family, the church, the educ?ition,system, the university, the 
military, and so on—normalize, structure, optimize, and subordinate-the 
forces of individuals to enter them into the machine* of the economic sys­
tem, to make them productive members of society who will happily defend 
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it to the death if necessary. Life, as both subject and object, has thereby 
emerged into the political 
Population, Security, and Govemmentality 
Interestingly enough, it is Foucault's more in-depth engagement with the 
concept of "population" that will ultimately result in a significant termi­
nological shift on his part. It is important to note—given the tremendous 
dissemination of the concepts of biopower and biopolitics by theorists fol­
lowing in the footsteps of Foucault—the durational brevity of Foucault's 
own engagement with and employment of these terms specifically. By 1978 
he drops the language of biopower and of biopolitics, or rather resituates 
their conceptual apparatuses within the context-of the broader notion of 
what he calls "govemmentality." This concept he understands primarily 
as "the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflec­
tions, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, 
albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political 
economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as 
it essential technical instmment."^'' As noted above,Foucault introduces 
the concept of "biopolitics" in a 1974 lecture in Rio de Janeiro, and the 
concept of "biopower" first appears in the context of'his final lecture of 
the Spring semester, 1976, delivered at the College de France on March 17; 
this is followed by the somewhat extended treatment of the concepts of 
"biopolitics" and of "biopower" in part 5 of The History of Sexuality, vol­
ume 1. Foucault then took a sabbatical in the 1976-77 academic year, re­
turning to lecturing on January 11, 1978, and giving to his lectures for the 
1977-78 year the title of Security, Territory, Population. The very first line of 
the opening lecture begins in the following way: "This year I would like 
to begin studying something that I have called, somewhat vaguely, bio­
power. This announcement therefore heralds'explicitly the reopening x)f 
the question of biopower, which he had launched for the first time in his 
last letture almost two years prior as if to suggest that thd?leaure series on 
which he was about to embark was conceived as a direct' continuation of 
a problematic that had been merely announced and whose substance had 
yet to be plumbed. This suspicion is ftirther provoked by the fact that he 
takes up, point by point, what he considers to be five guiding intentions of 
the analyses to follow, many of which circulate around his earlier articula­
tion of the concept of biopower itself: (1) the analysis does not propose to 
offer a general theory of what power is, as such; (2) relations of power are 
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not supervenient upon relations of production, relations of family, sexual 
relations, etc.; rather, "mechanisms of power are an intrinsic part of all 
these relations, and, in a circular way, are both their effect and cause"''; 
(3) given the extent and doinains of these analyses (economics, historical 
formations, etc.), they may branch into the framework of a general analysis 
of society, but ought not be confused with history or with economics, as 
Foucault's analyses concern, he says, only "the politics of truth, which, 
he claims, is the primary recognizable definition of "philosophy" for him; 
(4), the analyses are meant to offer only a "conditional imperative"''—if re­
sistance is sought, here are the trajectories along which it may be pursued; 
that is, the analysis is meant to propose merely avenues, not particular di­
rectives, for political resistance; (5) the one and only "categorical" impera­
tive he offers—never engage in theoretical, polemics, as this serves only to 
severely exhaust the relation between struggle and truth. These five threads, 
specifically when they-speak of the pervasive relationality of power that 
would subvert any theorization of power as such, echo quite closely the 
earlier formulation of the concept of biopower. 
It is in the context of these five general threads that Foucault intro­
duces in the lectures the notion of "security," which he.understands-as 
the structured efforts to rigorously study and manipulate the probabilities 
and statistics having to do with the phenomena detrimental to the overall 
"health" of a society. Generally speaking, these apparatuses determine what 
are tolerable and intolerable levels of these phenomena, to assess what are 
the "tipping-points" at which the costs of restricting the phenomena out­
weigh the benefits, and ultimately, to stabilize these probabilities within 
acceptable ranges..la short/ the strategies of "security," Foucault says, aim 
to manage forces and circulations (pathological, economic, sexual, peda­
gogical, disciplinary, etc.) in a society, by way of direct intervention on the 
given milieu occupied by. the individuals of the society. In this way, "in­
stead of a binary division between the permitted and the prohibited, one 
establishes an average considered as optimal on the one hand, and, on the 
other, a bandwidth of the acceptable that'must not be exceeded."'® Fou­
cault articulates the distinction between the three specific models of power 
relations: "let's say then that sovereignty capitalizes a territory, raising the 
major problem of the seat-of government, whereas discipline structures a 
space and addresses'thejessential problem of a hierarchical and functional 
distribution of elements, and security will try to plan a milieu in terms of 
events'or series of events'or possible elements, of series that will have to be 
regulated within a multivalent and transformable framework."'^ 
By all appearances, therefore, in the inaugural lecture of Foucault's re-
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turning semester, he is on track to.continue with a more thorough explica­
tion of.the radical concept of biopower that he had, by this time, merely 
introduced, doing so within the framework of an analysis of "security" 
(which at this time sounds quite close to the description of, or at least a 
component of, the biopolitics of the population, -discussed above). Yet, follow­
ing the opening declaration of intent of the 1978 lectures, the terms "bio­
power" and "biopolitics" are almost entirely absent from the remainder 
of the lectures. Furthermore, just three weeks after the opening lecture, on 
February 1, 1978, Foucault makes the following startling claim:-"Basically, 
if I had wanted to give the leaures I am giving this year a more exact title, 
I certainly would not have chosen 'security, territory, population.' What I 
would really like to undertake is something that I would call a history of 
'govemmentality.'What then, we should ask, happens in these interim 
weeks? Why does Foucault announce on January 11 that he intends to 
study "biopower," but then suggest on Febmary 1 that the title for the lec­
tures he is currently giving is no longer appropriate and should be replaced 
with an emphasis on "govemmentality," a concept that he has only just 
introduced? There are a couple of important points to make in response to 
these inquiries. 
A tremendously significant, albeit subtle, shift occurs in Foucault's ter­
minology between the first and second lectures from the 1977-78 year, re­
garding the relation between the individual, multiplicity, and population. 
In the context of cursory comments on the spatiality of the three specific 
models of power relations, Foucault suggests that one* might perhaps be 
tempted to differentiate the spatiality of the three in the following way: 
sovereignty acts on territory, discipline acts on bodies, and security acts on 
populations. This schematization, though tidy and neat, does not quite 
hold together, and Foucault dismisses it at the end. While sovereignty, it 
is tme, is a model that is through and through inscribed with territoriality, 
it is nevertheless the case, Foucault thinks, that "the effective, real, daily 
operations of the actual exercise of sovereignty point to a certain multi­
plicity, but one which is treated as a multiplicity of subjeas, or [as] the 
multiplicity of a people."'' Sovereignty therefore, though it is essentially 
inseparable from a notion of territory, nevertheless operates on the mul­
tiplicity of the sovereign's subjects. In an analogous way, the .same can be 
said, Foucault thinks, of the disciplinary mechanisms discussed above. 
Discipline, it is tme, intervenes directly on the forces of the body itself to 
challenge and optimize them. At the same time, it does so precisely to the 
end of situating that particular body -within a- hierarchy that precedes it. 
Thus the disciplinary model as well operates on a group of individuals as 
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on a multiplicity: "The individual is much more a particular way of dividing 
up the multiplicity for a discipline than the raw material from which it is 
donstructed."'"' Hence, the basic spatial distinction that would say that sov­
ereignty acts on territory while discipline acts on individuals simply does 
not hold up, as both, Foucault argues, act on multiplicities—a multiplicity 
of subjects in the case of the sovereign and a multiplicity of hierarchically 
organized individuals in the case of discipline. What then of security? 
It is here that the major shift between the lectures of January 11 and Jan-
uary«18 takes place.-On January 11, Foucault claims, "So sovereignty and 
discipline, as well as security, can only be concerned with multiplicities. 
Therefore, the population, which is the object of security, is in this'first lec­
ture considered a "multiplicity," or an organization of the multiple as the 
multiple. By,the following week of January 18, however, Foucault comes to 
characterize the population as precisely not a multiplicity-r-the multiplic­
ity in the model of security comes to be that inconsequential group that 
falls outside the population, while the population itself will be seen as a 
newly emergent political subject unto itself an individual we might say, of 
a different sort. Foucault makes this discovery in the context of an analysis 
of the phenomenon of and of the discursive engagements surrounding, 
"scarcity." 
In the January 18 lecture, Foucault writes, "I would like now to resume 
this analysis of apparatuses of security with another example in order to 
pick out something that is no longer the relationship to space and the mi­
lieu, but- the relationship of government to the event. I vnll take straight­
away the example of scarcity.""^ This mention of "government" announces 
the avalanche, of terminological usages of concepts having to do with "gov­
ernment," "governing," and ultimately, "govemmentality." The phenom­
enon of scarcity, the insufficiency of food resources to meet basic subsis­
tence needs, is problematic in the context of the discussion of population, 
for a number, of reasoiis. First, scarcity is a phenomenon such that it tends 
toward'self-perpetuation. As>it worsens, the phenomenon of scarcity be­
comes also a problem forthe st];ategies of power, inasmuch as these height­
ened moments of crisis and need tend to produce the inevitable outcome 
of revolt: "So it is the scourge of the population on one side, and, on the 
other, catastrophe, crisis if you like, for govemment."'*' Thus, scarcity comes 
to be seen as an event that the govemment of population must prepare for 
and avoid. However, to do so, government through the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries will employ "a system of legality and a system of regu­
lations, which'was basically intended to prevent food shortage, that is to 
say, not just halt it or eradicate it when it occurs, but literally to prevent it 
Why Biopower? Why Now? / 11 
and ensure t^iat it cannot take place at all.'""* The strategies and measures 
einployed impose stria regulations on the prices of grain, on the amount 
of land that can be.cultivated, on the exportation of grain, and on its stor­
age. The hope in the use of these strategies is to produce enough food to 
feed the townspeople (but only enough), such that the peasants (who pro­
duce the grain) are paid as little as possible (but not so little that they can 
no-longer afford to plant a sufficient amount of grain) and the townspeo­
ple can be fedfor as low a cost as possible, thereby staving off in advance 
the phenomenon of scarcity and, more important, the revolt that would be 
sure to follow. 
This is the theory behind the system, but unfortunately, the contingency 
and intervention of natural forces will ensure, historically, that the theory 
does not gd a'S planned. The actual ejfect of the implementation of these 
strategies is that the minimization of prices in fact severely impedes the 
planting of grain on the part of the peasantry. When there is a surplus of 
grain, the already-low prices are driven further down—a contingency that 
the power struaure cannot anticipate or prevent—thus, the peasantry who 
produce the grain do not break even financially, which thereby further lim­
its the amount of grain they can afford to plant the following season. This 
effea is intensified when, due to unprediaable climatic variations, however 
seemingly slight they may be, the harvest yields less than was prediaed. In 
short, the very limitations and restrictions designed to prevent scarcity con­
stantly run the risk of producing the very scarcity it sought to prevent. 
But the very reason that scarcity was seen as the intolerable event that 
must be prevented in advance by legislative means was the governmental 
fear of revolt in the face of widespread famine. With th6 emergence of po­
litical economists of the eighteenth century, the tendency toward revolt 
will come to be seen as engendered precisely by the abrupt widespread 
recognition of pervasive scarcity: "it was precisely this kind of immediate 
solidarity, the massiveness of the event, that constituted its charaaer as a 
scourge.*'" Therefore, with the freedom of commerce, proposed by these 
political economists, there will no doubt, indeed necessarily, be periods of 
scarcity. But the scarcity that occurs will not be like the scarcity that arises, 
severely and abruptly, under the conditions of a strictly regulated market.* 
Rather, the scarcity that will arise under the fireedom of commerce will be 
more gradual, gaining slowly in intensity and severity over time, as op­
posed to the abrupt sort of e^^ents that produce mob mentality. Before it 
gets too extreme,"the scarcity will be ameliorated by the very forces that 
helped produce it. The loss of the unlucky few who succumb to the scar­
city is natural and necessary, and it secures the avoidance of scarcity by the 
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population writ large. By allowing these "naturally ^jccurring" periods of 
scarcity to take holdpf a small number of individuals, the scarcity for the 
population itself can be, hy and. large, drastically reduced. Foucault writes, 
"So there will no longer be any scarcity in general, on condition that for a 
whole series of people, in a whole series of markets, there was some scar­
city, some deamess, some difficulty in buying wheat, and consequently 
some hunger, and it may well be that some people die of hunger after all. 
But by letting these people die of hunger one will be able to make scarcity 
a chimera >and prevent it occurring in this massive form of the scourge typi­
cal of previous systems.""^ 
Hence the terminological shift—where in the previous week, Foucault 
had suspected that the power models of sovereignty, of discipline, and of 
security had all operated on multiplicities, with the birth of the "popula­
tion," Foucault now thinks, a new political subject/object is bom.> It is no 
longer a multiplicity because it is not at all the individual, nor is it groups 
of individuals, who matters under the model of security; rather it is the 
population itself The multiplicity is precisely the name given to those in­
dividuals who fall outside the population, the unlucky ones who are its by­
products. Hence under the model of security, we 
have two levels of phenomena therefore. Not a level of the collective and 
a levet of the individual, for after all it is not just an individual who will 
die, or-at any rate suffer, from this scarcity. But we will have an absolutely 
fundamental caesura between a level that is pertinent for the government's 
economic-political action, and this is the level of the population, and a dif­
ferent level, which will be that of the series, the multiplicity of individuals, 
who will not be pertinent, or rather who will only be pertinent to the extent 
that, properly managed, maintained, and encouraged, it will make possible 
what one wants to obtain at the level that is pertinent. The multiplicity ofi 
individuals is no longer pertinent, the population is.^' 
Therefore the population emerges as a political being unto itself and it is 
at the level of the population that the strategies of security intervene, while 
the multiplicity, though a necessary component of the strategies" of secu­
rity (inasmuch as its "exclusion" makes possible the security of the popula­
tion), is not its direct object. 
We could perhaps suggest (and this will be one of the topics addressed 
in this volume), that when Foucault comes to in fact analyze the biopolitics 
of the population, which had previously been subsumed beneath the gen­
eral banner of biopower (along with its companion pole of the anatomo-
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politics of the body),' that what he discovers is that there is a more drastic 
difference between the objects of the disciplinary model and the model 
of security than he had perhaps previously thought. Hence Foucault per­
haps no longer believed it obvious that the models of discipline and se­
curity fit so tidily and comfortably together beneath the general banner 
of "biopower," that the objert of anatomo-politics and the object of bio­
politics were so distinct as to justify a terminological shift such that, while 
the disciplinary model is no doubt still operative (as we should remind 
ourselves that for Foucault, a new regime of power always subsumes and 
incorporates the sttategies of previous models), it is so only in support of 
the health and well-being of the population, now understood as its own 
sort of political animal. 
The language of "govemmentality" to which Foucault tums at this point 
is discovered in what he characterizes as a "flourishing development of a 
significant series of treatises that do not exactly present themselves as ad­
vice to the prince, nor yet as political science, but which, between advice to 
the prince and treatises of political science, are presented as arts of govern­
ment."''® It is in the sixteenth century, Foucault claims, in the shift between 
the sovereign model and the model of security, that the general problem 
of "govemment" arises, and this in a multitude of forms: (1) the govem­
ment of oneself, in the f6rm of a return to an emphasis on Stoic thought;'*' 
(2) the govemment of souls and of human conduct, in the form of pastoral 
power; (3) the government of children, apparent by. an explosion of texts 
centered on pedagogical strategies; (4) finally, the govemment of the state. 
"How to govem oneself how to be govemed, by whom should we accept 
to be govemed, how to be the best possible govemorT''^" It is important to 
note that the literature on government from this period does not treat the 
concept of govemment from the standpoint of sovereignty, according to 
Foucault. Even when it is ostensibly discussing the administration of the sov­
ereign, it does so nevertheless in terms of the right arrangement of things— 
resources, wealth, the people, and so on. The art of govemment, therefore, 
presupposes a multitude of various ends, each suited specifically to their 
unique objects; "the government will have to ensure that the greatest pos­
sible amount of wealth is produced, that the people are provided with suf­
ficient means of subsistence, and that the population-can increase.These 
discourses on govemmentality operate v/ithin a framework that accords 
quite naturally with the delimitations of the sovereign model of power that 
had helped shape the language of "biopower" for Foucault. In addition, 
the areas over which "government" functions* (economy, resources, health, 
security, population, crime, etc.) are well suited to the analyses of the statis-
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tical model, burgeoning in the eighteenth century and central to Foucault's 
earlier articulation of the biopolitics of the population. Thus, even as Foucault 
continues to promise an analysis of biopolitics and biopower through the 
1^7^_78,and 1978-79 lectures, his terminology shifts progressively to the 
language of govemmentality. 
Objections and Replies 
At the same time, the discoveries that Foucault makes with the concept of 
biopower have resulted in conceptual apparatuses that occupy his- work for 
the remainder of his life. Some of these discoveries are as follows: (1) a 
model of power relations that is essentially expansionary, of the forces of 
lif^ rather than delimiting; (2) the ubiquity of power relations throughout 
all other modes and types of relations; (3) the persistence with which new 
models of power employ the fear of sovereign power for the purposes of 
maintaining insidious control. All in all, these conceptual apparatuses, as 
the diversity of contributions in this volume attests, have not gone away— 
they continue to operate to this^day throughout all areas of life. 
Obvious objections present themselves to us. First, why does sovereign 
power, now for the most part relegated to a subordinate role, continue to 
guide our understandings of the political? Put otherwise, if biopower has 
indeed become the pervasive modem model of power, as Foucault claims 
that it has, why is it. not recognizable as such? Foucault provides two re­
sponses. The first is that the very persistence of the conceptual model of 
sovereignty.continues to setve as;a critical tool Against the.reemergence of 
sovereign power atself. In other words, if biopower, first in its disciplin­
ary form and'subsequently in its regulatory form, is indeed to supplant 
sovereign power, it .needs a critical apparatus to ever keep sovereignty at 
bay, and this apparatus is the very concept of sovereignty itself serving as 
the constant reminder of the "dangers" of the excesses of power. Second, 
above we stated that the relevance of biopower is necessarily masked, for 
the sake of its preservation. In modern, "liberal" forms of govemment, the 
understanding of power as "sovereignty" persists, but in a dispersed form. 
The state is a "sovereign," but one in which its subjects, by virtue of their 
being "free" citizens or self-^oveming agents of the polls, are themselves 
understood to be "sovereign." Sovereignty as the perceived, model of power 
continues, but it is democratized such that each participant is rational, rea­
sonable, responsible, and,capable of making good decisions, of exercising 
one's own'"sovereignty," so long as she does not impose her will on an­
other "sovereign" individual within the system. Thus, believing ourselves 
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free, or sovereign, in this manner, the de facto mechanisms of domination 
elude us, and we do not recognize our own subjugation; or, put otherwise;, 
we do not recognize the ways in which our desires and our very choices are 
constituted by the relations within the system itself: 
Second objection: if this model of powers is bent on generating forces, 
expanding and monitoring life, how is it that the nineteenth and twen­
tieth centuries, the period in which the two poles of biopower were ac­
tively concretizing into . an. organic whole, exemplifies the most extreme 
nationalistic, discourses that would produce the most totalizing slaughters 
the world has ever seen? Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Dachau, Dresden, Hiro­
shima, Nagasaki, and so on are all embodiments of this so-called modem 
form of power focused on*"life." Is this not problematic for Foucault's ar­
gument? On the contrary, Foucault wall claim that this" economy of dea^h is 
merely the dark underside of a power over life, its logical extension. With 
the emergence of the modem nation-state following the Peace of Westpha­
lia in the twilight of the middle ages, the bellicosity that had permeated 
the daily relations of society is relatively marginalized. Warfare becomes 
more centralized, and a permanent, "professional" military comes to be 
formed. Furthermore, the state apparatus itself provides a more consistent 
level of stability, such that bellicose violence, when it does occur, does so at 
the limits or frontiers of the state. Paradoxically, this marginalization of the 
role of warfare in daily life is contemporaneous, Foucault claims, with the 
emergence of a new form of discourse; one that sees war as thc'constitutive 
element of established institutions: "we have to interpret the war that is 
going on beneath peace; peace itself is a coded war."'^ In the throes of this 
war, one must choose sides: "A binary stmrture mns through society."^' 
This war is believed to be a permanent one, stretching back to a social orga­
nization's origins/ extending through the modem age in an insidious and 
subterranean form, and culminating in a decisive final battle that is yet to 
come and for which we must prepare. This discourse is thus motivated by 
mythical elements, imbued with glorious notions of good and evil, and 
heroic notions of sacrifice, bloodshed, and ultimate triumph-. The binary 
stmcture of society is one in which the "good," or the "pure" is threatened 
from within by the "bad" or "impure," and in this stmggle there can be 
only one victor. It is not difficult to see, then, where this linetjf reasoning 
leads Foucault:."The war that is going on beneath order and peace, thenar 
that undermines our sodety^nd divides it in a binary mode is, basically, a 
race war."^^ 
Whether in its explidtly biological form or its socially (or even cultur­
ally or religiously) motivated form, the interpretation-of the whole of a 
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society's history in terms of internal struggle, between the true and the im­
postor, who would seek to usurp the birthright of the "genuine" descen­
dants, is the dark underbelly of a model of power intimately invested in 
the discourse of life. In the interest of preserving one way of life, another 
must be annihilated—there js.no middle ground or compromise possible: 
"But this formidableipower of death . . . now presents itself as the coun­
terpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to 
administer, optimize,, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise conttols and 
comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a 
sovereign who must be. defended; ihey are waged on behalf of the existence 
of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purposes of whole­
sale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. 
Biopower does not operate anymore at the level of the individual, but it is 
waged at theJevel of the population, and, more important, exercised in the 
name of the biological existence of a population. It is "situated and exercised 
at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of 
population."^® > 
Finally the third objection: what of the death penalty? How can a sys­
tem of power, focused on the multiplication and fostering of life, ever de­
liberately execute an individual citizen? First, we must note the overall de­
crease in the use of capital punishment, especially in'the Western world, 
throughout the twentieth century, (the United States being the last Westem 
nation where it is still commonly practiced): "As soon as power gave it­
self the fiinction of administering life, its reason for being and the logic 
of its exercise—and not the awakening of humanitarian feelings—made it 
more and more difficult to apply the death penalty."®' Here the termino­
logical apparatuses of failed normalization and.pathology, and of threat, 
intervene. Whereas capital punishment used to be merely an exercise of 
justice, a punishment carried out for one of those, crimes falling under the 
class of "capital offense," it now becomes something of a proverbial "last 
resort" of the state against a criminal nature, a monster, a. thing so beyond 
the pale of humanity as to be irredeemable, someone who, were they to 
ever escape or be released, would pose a severe and imminent threat to the 
safety and security of society as a whole. 
Foucault thus presents us with a vision of power relations far more in­
sidious and pervasive than any-model of power hitherto conceptualized. 
The .fecundity of his concept is salient in the groundbreaking works of 
later European political theorists, whether in the form of critical expansion 
(Giorgio Agamben)'® or in the form of inheritance and application (Mi­
chael Hardt and AntoniatNegri,®' as well as Roberto Esposito®"). At the out-
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set, we claimed that biopower is a timely concept. It is our conviction that 
the conceptual mechanisms characterized by Foucault beneath the banner 
of "biopower" can go a long way toward helping us understand who we 
are, where we have come from, who we are becoming, and who we can be. 
It is a paradoxical fact of our culture that we- can become so emotionally 
and psychologically invested in preserving the life of a single individual 
who has existed in a bare, vegetative state for fifteen years,®* while simul­
taneously shrugging off the excess of 100,000 unprovoked Iraqi civilian 
deaths" caused by the Multi-National Force's military intervention since 
2003. Or that we can stage protests to protect the rights of US fetuses, while 
not flinching at the faa that in 2010, 7.6 million children in the world 
died from preventable causes.®' We enter the twenty-first century engrossed 
in a seemingly permanent "war on terror," where no one and everyone is 
"the enemy," welcoming the disciplinary struaures that accompany this 
war. Here the executive power of the United States can, at will and without 
trial, order (1) the execution of anyone on foreign "soil,-including US citi­
zens, deemed to be hostile to the interests of the US population, or; .('2) the 
indefinite detention of insubordinate US citizens arrested on US soil.®^ 
Meanwhile the debates that-populate our public sphere center on issues of 
health insurance requirements, birth control, gay marriage, dietary restric­
tions for families, immigration laws, stem cell research, future possibilities 
for radical genetic alterations and enhancements, and a multitude of other 
issues centered around life, the body, and the subjea as a living citizen in 
the polls. 
In This Volume 
Biopower: Foucault. and Beyond aitically engages with Foucault's concept 
of biopower while also reaching into the future, addressing today's prob­
lems but with an eye toward tomorrow's. As we have shown, biopower is 
a multifaceted concept. Thus, as editors, we have chosen each secdon to 
approach this concept from a.different perspeaive to ultimately provide a 
general understanding of biopower. 
Part 1, "Origins of Biopower," focuses on':the heterogeneous genesis 
of the concept of biopower, both in Foucault's works and in the works of 
other major biopolitical thinkers such as Giorgio Agamben and Antonio 
Negri. Judith Revel opens this part with an enigmatic concern: how can 
one raise the question of a literary (and linguisdc) birth of biopolitics 
when the literary moment in Foucault's oeuvre largely precedes his bio­
political concerns? Revel reconsiders here the different statutes of language 
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in Foucault's writings and shows how the linguistic period makes possible 
the prdcess of historidzation of the power of words. Ultimately-she reveals 
the slow transformation from knowledge about the world to power over the 
things and subjects in the world. And, Revel argues, subjectivation processes 
can be resisted and overcome only through a series of inventive processes, 
similar to the creative literary ojies, that enable human beings to reappro-
priate themselves. 
Ih'his contribution, Antonio Negri argues that the origins of biopolitics 
trace both to Foucault's work and, more.broadly, to a series of heterodox 
currents in Westem Marxism, as they have developed in Italy and France. 
Negri's point is that we cannot fully understand the concept of biopolitics 
without reinscribing it within a series*of events in the 1960s and 1970s; 
only then can we fiilly appreciate the political problem for which the con­
cept was supposed to stand as a new strategy-of intervention. Understand­
ing this new form of power, which is exerted on populations, on multiplic­
ities, on the multitude,,x:ieates a new space for creative-subjects and makes 
possible the exercise of their freedom. 
In a similar vein, Ian Hacking argues that understanding the origins of 
biopower requires an even broader historical timescale. The study of bio­
politics needs a historical perspective that highlights how the political body 
has-become the object of numerical manipulations. Statistical technolo­
gies have made possible the study of populations and have transformed 
them into objects of knowledge. The gathering of massive quantities of 
data was a necessary condition for recognizing pattems and for defining 
norms within a multiplicity and, ultimately, for controlling and altering 
social practices. 
The recent diversification of views about biopower and biopolitics— 
from Foucauh to Agamben, Negri, Hardt, and Esposito—has not always 
clarified these concepts; as a consequence, some scholars have rejected these 
notions altogether.,?^ Catherine Mills's contribution further clarifies the two 
concepts by considering the prefix "bio" and the ways in which different 
conceptions of biopolitics (Foucault Agamben, Esposito) have appealed to 
various aspects of the manifold concept^h/e. Ultimately, Mills argues that 
these biopolitical theories all share a significant difficulty: namely, they are 
unable to identify the limits of biopower and, consequently, are unable 
to conceptualize life independently of its» biopolitical production. Paul 
Patton's essay reinforces this critical perspective. Along with Mills, Patton 
identifies some of the confusions involyed in Foucault's early definitions of 
biopower (and biopolitics). Patton spells out very clearly some of the im-
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portant reasons that have led Foucault to abandon these conceptual tools 
in his subsequent .work. 
The second part, "The Question of Life," takes seriously the challenge of 
formulating the concept of life. Mary Beth Maderinvites AIS to reconsider 
Foucault's engagement with the concept of life and the ways in which it 
has first emerged- as the objea of sciences of life. By highlighting the re­
lations between.classical natural history (as developed in Les Mots et les 
Choses) and Georges Cuvier's fimctionalisf notion of life, this essay exposes 
the conceptual basis that underlines'Foucault's .understanding of life and 
problematizes the very object'of biopolitics. 
Building also on Foucault's broader conception of life as the one 
emerging from The Order ^of Things and from the History of Madness, Jef­
frey N'ealon finds a way not simply to .answer to Donh'a Haraway's charge 
of "species chauvinism" against Foucault, but also to show how, in Fou­
cault's early archaeological work, a whole series .otnegleaed formulations 
of animality are directly linked to the emergence of biopower. The notion 
of animality is supposed to decenter the focus of biopolitics from human 
biological processes to a broader concern for species or to a new zoology. 
This broader view of animality also plays a key role in Eduardo Mendieta's 
chapter. He explores a new space betwfeen biology (as the re'alm of neces­
sity) and politics (as 'the realm.x)f possible) to call into question the Judeo-
Christian scala naturae and to show how, through art, we can gain a better 
understanding of a (hermeneutical) middle between becoming animal-and 
ceasing to be human. » 
Foucault's bipolar conception of biopower,-as developed in La>¥olonte de 
Savoir, serves as a matrix for parts 3 and 4, which emphasize the anatomo-
politics of the body and the biopolitics of the population. Part 3, "Medicine and 
Sexuality:'The Question of the Body," focuses on two very significant-tech-
nologies of normalization in Foucault's works: medicine and sexuality. .In 
his contribution, Carlos Novas examines the ways in which new forms of 
political aaivism and biopolitical resistance haVe emerged to address the 
problems of rare diseases and orphan drugs. Patients' associations. Novas 
argues, have formed effective coalitions to support specific legislation' re­
quiring pharmaceutical companies to pay sufficient-attention to-individu­
als affeaed by Tare conditions. With respect to sexuality David >Halperin 
raises the question of gay»subjectivity and how this notion, of subjectivity 
has been constantly pathologized under numerous labels like "moral in­
sanity," "sexual perversion," "personality disorder," "mental .illness," and 
so on. Keeping the queer project alive, he argues, requires a dual process. 
20 / Vemon W. Cisney and Nicolae Morar 
First, it demands a radical separation of the question of subjectivity from 
any medical psychological, psychoanalytical, and'"scientific" explanations 
of homosexuality since those explanations will always tie the queer cul­
ture back to normative taxonomy (e.g., unsafe sex, HW/AIDS risks) whose 
biopolitical function is to produce "normal" subjects. Second, the notion 
of queer subjectivity has to be replaced with an entire political program 
grounded in a notion of gayness as a quasi-ethnic social identity as a way 
to escapethe psychological explanationjof queer subjects. 
Jana Sawicki's essay closes part-3 on the body by exposing the role 
that Foucault's analysis of biopolitics has played in Judith Butler's work. 
Sawicki address'es three important ways in which Butler incorporates and 
responds to Foucault's projects: first, through an analysis of the concept of 
normalization in relation to subjection and resistance; second, through the 
notion of precarious life since it brings back the question of the very object 
of biopolitics; and ultimately, through the ethical turn, which stresses- the 
need for a new ethic.' 
Part 4, "Neoliberalism and Govemmentality: The Question of the Pop­
ulation," focuses on the second pole of biopower and takes into consider­
ation Foucault's treatment of the question of the. population through the 
lenses of his-later engagements with the concepts of goverrimentality and 
neoliberalism..»Todd May and Ladelle McWhorter inVite us to think of how 
things have changed even for those of us who, following in the path of 
Foucault, used'to see'discipline everywhere. Hence, their question: how do 
we understand our present situation? Do we live in a completely new world 
where Foucault's concepts arcnot useful anymore to map out our present? 
May and McWhorter's thesis is that a new form of power has arisen in the 
past forty years, a neoliberal power, and their argument is that The Birth of 
Biopolitics lectures show us how Foucault has already anticipated this new 
form of govemmentality. 
The Birth of Biopolitics lectures (1978-79) represent a unique moment 
in' Foucault's works. On the one hand, Foucault produces new hypotheses 
about neoliberalism that are not taken up elsewhere (in either his books 
or interviews). So; it is difficult to predict to what extent they represent 
Foucault's ultimate wew on the matter. Second, within the series of lectures 
at College de France, The Birth of Biopolitics is the place where Foucault first 
analyzes immediately contemporary facts and current political events. Fre­
deric Gros argues that Foucault's engagement with neoliberalism, which 
seems initially foreign to biopolitics,' actually makes visible a new form of 
neoliberal biopolitics. The last contribution on biopolitics and populations 
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follows Foucault's engagement with immediate political events and con­
siders very recent revolutionary movements such as the Arab Uprisings. Mar­
tina Tazzioli focuses on a politics of/over life that relates to forms of gov­
emmentality that manage and control migrant populations. Those migrant 
populations have destabilized the strategies of what she calls "b/ordering" 
through their increased mobility and have created modes' of resistance and 
of transgression by redefining the meaning of space and by inventing new 
forms of political stmggle and survival strategies. 
Part 5, "Biopower Today" captures how the notion of biopower has 
evolved* Sfeyond Foucault. In other words, it highlights the ways in which 
this concept has gained in clarity and thereby provokes a certain academic 
traction to be used in fiiture work.®® Through a process of conceptual clari­
fication, Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose's argumenfertracts and'builds a 
model for recognizing biopolitical events in the fiiture. Those events entail 
a number of specific features such as tmth discourses about living beings, 
forms of authority who are deemed Competent to speak in the name of 
that tmth, strategies for collective intervention, and ultimately, modes of 
subjectification. In the light of this model, Rabinow and Rose consider also 
a series of recent biopolitical developments in race, population, and ge­
nomic medicine. 
In her contribution, "A Colonial Reading of Foucault," Ann Laura Stoler 
calls into question the idea that sexuality was "originally, historically bour­
geois" Foucault's assertion does not stand the test of colohial archives 
since it fails to capture the issue of race. Stole/s incentive,is to explain why 
Foucault is so elusive on this problem and to suggest that the biopolitical 
treatment of race should occupy a significantly more important place in 
colonial studies concerning sexuality and the education of desire. 
Roberto Esposito closes this volume by raising a significant question of 
how )ye should philosophically un4erstand the twentieth century: through 
the lenses of totalitarianism or biopolitics? Rather than subordinating 
the movement of history to the logic of a given philosophy, Esposito sees 
efvenits as consisting of elements thafare themselves' philosophical. Mean­
ing is, no longer stamped from outside, that is, from a point tljat coincides 
with.the philosophical perspective of the person- looking at the world. Es-
posito's response focuses on how meaning originates and is'"constituted 
by facts themselves. These two modaliti'es foi imderstanding contemporary 
history—that of the more traditional philosophy 0/history and that of his­
tory as philosophy—are often confused and superimposed. In Esposito's 
view, they are mutually exclusive in their presuppositions and effects on 
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meaning. This is why he emphasizes the importance of properly constru­
ing these two political paradigms of totalitarianism and of biopolitics. 
Every single contribution in this volume takes up some aspect of the 
concerns we have discussed about the concepts of biopower and bio­
politics. Whether connecting Foucault's literary tescts with the applied 
analyses of the biopolitical, or problematizing common understandings of 
the totalitarian face of the twentieth century, or contextualizing the bio­
political within the larger discourse of govemmentality, each piece in this 
volume directly contributes in an indispensable way to the animation of 
thought with respect to this concept of biopower, the concept of life in zmd 
as the political. The editors invite th« reader to engage with these contribu­
tions in an effort to, in the spirit of Foucault, think the history of the pres­
ent, which is always by necessity a thought of the future. 
Notes 
1. Some commentators have pointed out that this domain of inquiry might have pre­
ceded Foucault's work. Mauro Bertani points out that the notion of "biocratie" has 
already been present in Auguste Comte's writings as well as in those pf French psy­
chiatrist Edouard Toulouse. See Mauro Bertani, "Sur la gen^alogie du biopouvoir," 
in Lectures de Michel Foucault, vol. 1, A propos de "II faut difendre la society," ed. Mauro 
Bertani, Daniel Defert, Alessandro Fontana, Thomas C. Holt (Lyon: ENS Editions, 
2001), 19 Antonela Cutro makes a similar point in Biopolitica Storia e attualita di 
un concetto (Verona: Ombre Corte, 2005), 8. In his book, Biopolitics: An Advanced 
Introduction (New York: New York University Press, 2011), Thomas Lemke provides 
another interesting story about the birth (and the evolution) of the concept of bio­
politics (see 9-33). 
2. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault says "I would like to write the history of this 
prison with all the political investments of the body that it gathers together in its 
closed architecture. Why? Simply, because I am interested in the past? No, if one 
means by that writing a history of the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one means 
vmting'the'history of the present." In Michel Foucault, Surveiller et Punir—Naissance 
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